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Abstract
As transition countries establish and reform their market processes,
they also must determine the nature of the social support system and
the extent to which income will be redistributed in society.  In this
paper, we consider the impact of redistribution by comparing the level
and distribution of gross factor income and disposable income in
Estonia. We also consider these income statistics by different
demographic groups to see which households are most significantly
influenced by redistribution programs.
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21. Introduction
The conversion from a socialist planned economy to a market system
has brought with it the need for dramatically altered institutions, rules
and behaviours in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Former
Soviet Union (FSU).  Nearly every aspect of life, whether work life or
private life, has been affected by the process of privatisation, free
trade and increased market orientation.
In addition to the strengthening of the market process, however,
the transition also requires the reconstruction of the entire social
support system.  This is particularly true since, as pointed out by
Scholz and Tomann (1999), firms in the Soviet system were
responsible for fulfilling roles that are traditionally addressed by the
public sector (e.g. pensions, some health care and the guarantee of
employment).
In the past decade, we have seen the leadership of the CEE and
FSU nations face the question of ‘what is the role of the government
in the economy?’ to an extent barely imaginable to those in the more
long-standing market systems.  Historical precedents and institutional
memory give little guidance in defining the role of government – and
one might say that it is a good thing while another feels the loss of
momentum behind government actions as a detriment.  Regardless of
one’s views about government intervention, the difficult question of
‘what should the government do’ and ‘to what extent should the
government be involved’ are very important and very difficult issues.
While this debate takes many, many forms – from the
independence of financial institutions to price controls to what
industries should remain publicly owned – we will focus in this paper
on policies directly related to income distribution.  There are few more
important questions than ‘who gets what’– and that is the essential
outcome of the distribution of income in a market society.
Discussions of income distribution encompass numerous diverse,
difficult and controversial policy actions.  Both macroeconomic and
microeconomic issues and policies have an important impact on the
distribution of income.  While the structure of the tax code and the
nature of social transfers are clearly important in determining the
distribution of resources, so are policies addressing macroeconomic
stability, investment, unemployment, retraining and job creation,
regional development, and even school financing.
Income distributions throughout the CEE and FSU countries
have displayed increased inequality to various extents.  This continues
to be true in countries even after they have made the ‘U-turn’ in terms
3of output growth.  This income distribution pattern has been suggested
as a dramatic ‘stylised’ fact of the transition from a centrally planned
to market economy (Ferreira, 1999, and Deininger and Squire, 1996
for a very careful study of empirical evidence using internationally
comparable income distribution statistics).
Despite great efforts and numerous theoretical and empirical
studies, there is no consensus on the optimal level of income
inequality.  Both too much and too little inequality can be linked with
disincentives (to work or to invest) so that output and/or growth
suffer.  While the classic economic story says that there is a trade-off
between efficiency and equity, a great deal of recent evidence
suggests that this may not be the case and arguing against social
assistance on the grounds of promoting output or output growth may
not be necessary.
A substantial literature has developed since Kuznets famous
curve was introduced (Kuznets, 1955) and has incorporated some of
the most recent advances in economic thinking about economic
growth and development.  Kuznets’s theory suggests that economic
growth influences the income distribution with rewards to higher-
skilled workers and savers accruing initially during industrialisation
but followed by increased redistribution through institutional change
and as the poor share increasingly in the benefits of growth. Aghion,
Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa (1999) present a thorough survey of the
theories and empirical evidence showing income inequality as both
‘growth-enhancing’ and ‘growth-limiting’.  The direction of causality
is also called into question (Chang, 1994). The vigorous interest in
growth theory also has resulted in a substantial literature suggesting
that growth is affected by income inequality, particularly through
political processes and financial imperfections.1  This conflict suggests
there may be a simultaneous relationship between economic
performance (measured as growth of output or level of development)
and income inequality (measured in a variety of forms).
The expansion of the European Union into Central and Eastern
Europe projected to occur only a few short years from now has
prompted numerous studies of economic, government and social
institutions as well as economy structure and performance.  The nature
of income distribution is one of many important economic
characteristics that must be examined as the countries of Europe
continue to increase integration (Tegze, 1999).
In this paper, we consider the extent and nature of income
redistribution in Estonia in 1999.  We contrast market-oriented income
and total disposable income in order to see the influence of social
4policy on the income distribution.  The research presented follows
from a volume of research conducted by Branko Milanovic (primarily
1998a and 1999a, and also 2000, 1999b, 1998b). Milanovic, an expert
in income distribution in transition economies, used World Bank data
to examine the distribution of both gross factor income and disposable
income in a variety of transition countries.  We will concentrate here
on the distribution of factor and disposable income in Estonia by
detailed demographic characteristics.  We wish to see what types of
households are most dramatically influenced by non-market income
and how the distribution of income in Estonia compares to other
European nations.
Estonia has demonstrated remarkable progress in its transition to
an open market system (Eesti Pank, 2001).  The country is on its way
to joining the European Union where it will likely join along with
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia in the earliest
Central and Eastern European expansion.  There is question however
that all Estonians have not gained equally through the transition of the
past decade.  In this paper, we explain both the level and distribution
of income in Estonia based on the characteristics of the head of
household as well as compare disposable and gross factor income
distributions for these groups.
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 reviews some
basic theoretical descriptions about the determinants of income level
and distribution and the data and methodology used in our study.
Section 3 presents an overview of the level and distribution of gross
factor income and disposable total income in Estonia in 1999.  In
section 4, we consider international comparisons of income
distribution and contrast characteristics in Estonia with those of other
applicant and member nations of the EU.
2.  Methods and Data
There is a large collection of research documenting the characteristics
of income distribution in transition economies. Atkinson and
Micklewright (1992) provide pre-transition income level and
distribution statistics for many transition economies.  Recent work,
most notably by World Bank researchers, have created a picture of
changes in income distribution in transition countries (Deininger and
Squire, 1996; Milanovic, 1999a) showing a near universal increase in
both income levels and in the dispersion of income. The current
5research paper will add to this literature by considering the income
distribution in Estonia.
We will consider the level and distribution of gross factor income
(the income from markets before cash transfers) and disposable total
income.  We say gross factor income is ‘before cash transfers’ instead
of  ‘before government involvement’ to highlight the fact that many
government policies still influence gross factor income.  For example,
regional development programs, policies which aid the industry in
which a household member works or price controls in markets all
have an influence on the amount and value of output produced by a
worker and therefore have an impact on factor income level and
distribution.
The data we use in our study were collected by the Statistical
Office of Estonia through the Estonian Household Income and
Expenditure Survey in the third quarter of 1999.2 The Estonian
statistical office randomly draws individuals from the population to
participate in the survey.  Once these individuals are selected, data for
the entire household is collected. Data collected on each household
member include demographic characteristics (age, education,
nationality, gender), work characteristics (nature of work attachment,
industry, occupation), and income and taxes (by type for each
household member). Household information is also collected
including number of members, location (urban/rural) and expenditure
patterns.  Households with no reported income or incomplete records
for the head of household were rejected from the sample. The
completed sample was composed of 1,863 households and included
5,240 individuals. Because the sample method results in a bias toward
large households, weights are used so that each household correctly
represents a portion of the total Estonian population. These weights
were constructed by the Statistical Office of Estonia and showed that
the sample households represented a total of 444,757 households.
As in any empirical study, data quality issues are a concern.
Reported income may not correspond with real household income,
particularly among those individuals in the extremes of the income
distribution.  The Statistical Office of Estonia collects information in
their survey for income in-kind.  This includes non-money gains by
the household, for example, the value of farm or garden production or
traded services or goods.  This addition to the data set helps to include
the influence of the underground economy.  However, some economic
activity is likely to still go unreported. The efforts taken by the
Statistical Office to collect information on all household members and
all household economic activities are guided by international
6standards and the inclusion of in-kind information goes far to reduce
the impact of the underground economy.
In reporting household income statistics, it is important to
consider household size. For the income measure to capture the
wellbeing of the household, it is necessary to consider income per
capita.  However, we use household income per equivalent adult to
distinguish the difference in needs of children as opposed to adult
household members.  While the weight used to calculate equivalent
adult could vary, 0.5 is the standard.
3. The Level and Distribution of Income in Estonia in 1999
In this section of the paper, we contrast first the level and distribution
of gross factor income, disposable total income and social assistance
for various types of households in the Estonian economy. We examine
the influence of age, education, gender and household characteristics.
Level of Income Differences by Demographic Group
To study the level of income based on household characteristics, we
look to classical models of economic behaviour.  Those with higher
human capital accumulation or work potential (that is, the well
educated, the more experienced/older workers, and male workers due
to the argument of longer labour force attachment) are expected to
receive greater gross factor income. The level of disposable total
income is less straightforward to predict due to the role of social
policy – the greater the social policy interventions, the less likely the
classical economic model will hold.  However, we would anticipate
that the same characteristics influence disposable total income, though
possibly to a lesser extent attributed to the equalising force of transfers
and progressive taxation.
Table 1 summarises the average level of household income per
equivalent adult in the third quarter of 1999.  Results are reported in
Estonian kroons (EEK) per month.3
Overall, we find overall gross factor income (that is, the income
from wages, agricultural earnings, mediation activities, self-
employment, and other directly market-oriented activities) was 2,109
EEK per equivalent adult per month while disposable total income
(income including social assistance and other transfers) was 3,155.80
EEK per equivalent adult per month. By comparing gross factor
income to disposable total income, we get some measure of the extent
of redistribution through transfers and tax policy. Average social
7assistance per month was 879.71 EEK per equivalent adult, which
accounts for the majority of difference in factor and total income.
Table 1.  Average Income Per Equivalent Adult by Demographic
Characteristic
1999 Q3 (Estonian kroons per month)
Gross Factor
Income
Disposable Total
Income
Social
Assistance
 % of
Hholds Avg Std Dev Avg Std Dev Avg Std Dev
Overall 2109.81 3692.17 3155.8 4134.10 879.71 1126.03
 
By Gender
       Male 39.85 2757.59 2950.62 3704.1 522.78 800.26 2329.40
     Female 60.15 1680.65 3546.17 2792.6 4188.90 932.34 1044.22
 
By Age
     <25 5.32 3287.43 5227.01 3904.8 5505.77 298.15 447.23
     25-44 34.27 2924.12 3918.32 3494.2 4053.27 410.24 763.05
     45-59 24.05 3071.94 4915.10 3809.5 6209.49 502.57 804.11
     60+ 36.37 534.25 1549.33 2295.2 1905.02 1656.42 1010.42
 
Education
    Basic 26.84 762.45 1753.64 2093.1 1716.34 1246.02 1059.12
    Secondary 59.07 2250.56 3420.85 3126.5 3532.95 721.09 1081.64
    College 14.09 4086.36 5884.36 5303.1 7477.37 846.89 1253.40
Next, we examine the influence of the gender of the head of
household.  The gender of the head of household frequently has a
strong relationship with the level of income. Females around the globe
earn less than similarly positioned males.  There are many possible
reasons for this pattern and we do not use a methodology here to
examine why there is a difference.  Also, female-headed households
may have a lower number of adults or earners resulting in lower
average income.  In our sample, we see there is a large difference
between average factor and disposable income per equivalent adult by
gender and this difference is most pronounced for factor income.
8Female-headed households earn 60.1 percent of the factor income of
male-headed households and 75.4 percent of the disposable total
income of male-headed households.  The average social assistance
earned for male and female-headed households is essentially the same
(at 800.26 and 932.34 EEK per equivalent adult, respectively).
We also examine income level based on the age of the head of
household.  This relationship is more complex and likely to be non-
linear.  Both factor income and total disposable income likely increase
at first as the head of household ages.  The reasons include increased
job experience and institutional attachments that increase earnings and
increased savings and investments that generate further increases in
income. Also, as household heads enter later early adulthood and
middle adulthood, they are more likely to have either children or
elderly family members in the household, which increases government
transfers, and thus total income. As household heads age further,
however, their attachment to the labour market may lessen and they
may find themselves less likely to be successful in the new market
economy due to decreased flexibility or a mismatch of skills and job
opportunities.  The elderly in transition economies face the additional
disadvantage of a limited ability to save and a decreased value of
those savings following the high inflation, early transition period.
Clearly age will have an impact on the level and dispersion of income
in our study.
In Table 1, we see that the level of average household factor and
disposable income per equivalent adult is surprising. The highest level
of factor income per equivalent adult was earned by the youngest
cohort, those with a head of household aged under 25 years.  This is
likely to have resulted for a few reasons – these households are less
likely to include children and therefore the ratio of earners to
household members is larger.  This is evidenced also by the average
social transfer to these households, which was only 298 EEK. A
caution is in order however since only 5.32 percent of our sample was
composed of households with a head under age 25.  It is likely that
many individuals of this age, even those who are married and have
children, continue to live with other household members because they
cannot afford to be on their own.  The households with a 18-25 year
old head that we identify may constitute only the very top of the
young adult individual income distribution.
Average factor income per equivalent adult is nearly equal
among households with 25-44 year old heads and 45-59 year old
heads.  Factor income was 83.6 and 80.6 percent of disposable income
respectively, a dominant source of income among this age group.  The
9average household factor income per equivalent adult in households
with a head over age 59 is very low as would be expected  (534.25
EEK per month). Social assistance is significantly larger among
households with an older head at 1,656.42 EEK per month compared
to 502.57 EEK per month for the 45-59 age group. Disposable total
income per month is considerably lower for the oldest age group than
for any other.4
Because education increases productivity, it is anticipated that
higher educated heads of household will have a higher level of factor
and total income.  If well-educated households receive proportionately
less government transfer payments and since the officially
proportional tax system is actually operating as a two-step progressive
tax system, we would anticipate the difference in level of factor
income will be more dramatic than the difference in disposable total
income due to educational attainment.
Table 1 shows that average factor income and average total
income do increase with higher education. In addition, the
composition of income varies dramatically by education group.  For
households headed by an individual with a basic (less than secondary)
education, factor income was only 36.43 percent of disposable income
and this group received the largest average social assistance. In
contrast, households where the head had a college education had an
average factor income that was 77.06 percent of disposable income.
Average social assistance received was smallest for households
headed by an individual with secondary education, an effect that is
most likely linked to the number of children in the home.
The Distribution of Income
Table 2 shows the income distribution for gross factor income per
equivalent adult and disposable total income per equivalent adult.5 We
find an overall Gini coefficient for the gross factor income distribution
to be 60.13 while the Gini coefficient for disposable total income is
31.80. This enormous difference in the Gini coefficient value indicates
the importance of redistribution of income in the Estonian society.
For example, the households in the bottom half of the population in
terms of factor income received only 6.78 percent of total factor
income while households in the top tenth received 37.24 percent.  The
bottom half of the population in terms of disposable income receives
29.18 percent of all disposable income, significantly more than their
6.78 percent of factor income.
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Table 2.   Overall Distribution of Income
1999 Quarter 3
Gross
Factor Income
Disposable
Total Income
Decile
%
Income
% Cumulative
Income
%
Income
% Cumulative
Income
1st 0 0 3.47 3.47
2nd 0 0 5.57 9.04
3rd 0 0 6.75 15.79
4th 1.38 1.38 6.77 22.56
5th 5.4 6.78 6.62 29.18
6th 8.57 15.35 8.14 37.32
7th 11.37 26.72 10.11 47.43
8th 15.22 41.94 10.74 58.17
9th 20.82 62.76 14.06 72.23
10th 37.24 100 27.77 100
Gini Coefficient 60.13 31.80
It is important to emphasise that there are two main ways that
factor income and disposable total income differ.  First, factor income
is before tax and disposable total income is calculated after tax.  Two-
step tax systems, like in the case of Estonia, therefore, would tend to
make the Gini coefficient for disposable income smaller. Also, factor
income includes only market-oriented income generated. In-kind
transfers and social aid are included in total income along with the
value of factor income. From our work here, we see that redistribution
programs in terms of cash assistance and tax policy result in an overall
change in the Gini coefficient of nearly 30 points.
Characteristics by Decile of Disposable Income
To get a better understanding of how income is dispersed among
households, we describe the overall characteristics of households in
each decile category.6
The average values of factor income and disposable income
increase as expected. The average level of Social Assistance (SSA)
however increases from the 1st to the 6th decile and then falls. The
bottom decile consists mainly of households with children and level of
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child benefits is low. As a big share of pensioners households are in
fourth and fifth decile, the amount of SSA is in the middle deciles
high. The ninth and tenth decile consists of households with fewer
members and children in the best working age, so the amount of SSA
is lesser than in the middle deciles.
While the average amount of SSA increased until the 6th decile,
households in the third decile had the highest ratio of SSA to
disposable income. Those in the highest income decile only received
7.56 percent of disposable income from SSA while those in the
poorest decile received 61.19 percent.  Factor income as a percentage
of total disposable income increased as household income increased.
Those in the lowest decile had factor income that was 34.85 percent of
total income while households in the top bracket had factor income of
88.64 percent of total income. Since factor income includes all market
activities (not just wages), this is simply saying that less of their
disposable income is the result of government redistribution as
compared to less wealthy households.
Average household size was smallest among the 2nd and 3rd
decile (2.23 and 2.01 members respectively) and varied little in other
deciles (approximately 2.9 members per household). Smaller
households will likely receive lower social transfers.  However, they
also would receive a higher income per equivalent adult for any given
number of earners.
We see that 36.04 percent of households in the lowest deciles
have a head with less than high school education and only 6.60
percent of households have a head with a college degree. This
suggests that education is strongly significant in income distribution.
The result for secondary education is less clear.  A large percentage of
the population reported this educational category and the percentage
of households with secondary education varies little from decile to
decile.
Households in the lower deciles are much more likely to have a
female head of household. 75 percent of households in the first 2
deciles had a female head while 37 percent of households in the top 20
percent of disposable total income were female-headed.
The average age of the head of household did not vary
dramatically by decile.  Those in the top income deciles had slightly
younger heads of household suggesting the presence of more elderly
heads in the lower income deciles.
Table 3. Characteristics of the Population by Decile*,1999 Quarter 3
Average Average Average % of Total % of Total Average % with % with % with % with Average
Disposable Gross Social Income Income Household Basic Secondary College Female Age
Decile Total Income Factor Inc Assist From SSA From Factor Size Education Education Education Head Of Head
1st 800.70 297.69 481.43 61.19 34.85 3.03 36.04 57.36 6.60 75.13 46.6
2nd 1317.09 479.20 797.10 60.29 36.68 2.23 38.31 55.2 6.49 75.97 55.5
3rd 1547.37 458.51 1064.08 68.73 29.68 2.01 41.67 54.86 3.47 67.36 59.0
4th 1780.53 646.90 1082.49 60.62 36.55 2.76 40.46 51.44 8.09 65.90 56.4
5th 2086.69 797.16 1212.43 58.14 37.99 2.59 32.98 56.54 10.47 56.02 56.1
6th 2430.84 1337.53 1008.31 41.55 54.96 2.98 24.76 59.13 7.77 52.43 50.0
7th 2921.14 1990.20 831.90 28.46 68.20 3.00 25.46 60.65 13.89 42.59 47.5
8th 3544.95 2562.30 850.67 24.39 71.98 2.96 12.50 69.27 18.23 47.40 46.7
9th 4979.93 4291.46 534.96 10.95 85.96 3.17 10.40 70.3 19.31 37.13 43.3
10th 9619.59 8293.84 758.59 7.56 88.64 3.04 7.49 53.48 39.04 37.97 44.9
*  The decile categories used here are based on disposable total income per equivalent adult.  We use this breakdown since the factor
income distribution included empty deciles.   Income and SSA values are in Estonian kroons per month.
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We can see by Tables 1 and 3 that the demographic
characteristics of the head of household have a close relationship with
the level of income and where the household falls in terms of the
income distribution. In Table 4, we examine the distribution of income
within each household type.
Table 4.   Income Distribution by Demographic Characteristic
Q3, 1999
Gross Factor
Income
Disposable Total
Income
Social
Assistance
 Gini Coefficient Gini Coefficient Gini Coefficient
Overall 39.83 31.8 47.59
By Gender
Male 52.54 31.86 56.65
Female 65.19 31.48 41.51
By Age
<25 40.55 31.43 68.34
25-44 42.43 33.51 55.99
45-59 45.9 36.07 64.51
60+ 86.89 18.02 7.18
By Education
Basic 77.11 17.17 24.42
Secondary 52.17 29.02 53.91
College 48.43 35.32 57.47
Income Distribution by Demographic Characteristic
As in other CEE and FSU countries, Estonia experienced an increase
in income inequality throughout its transition to a market economy.
Recent theoretical work has suggested some mechanisms to explain
this increase in income inequality during the transition to a market
system.  We also can look to these theories to better understand the
influences on the income distribution and its likely pattern for the
future.
The standard practice of the models used to identify changes due
to transition focus primarily on the shifting of resources (particularly
14
labour) from the lower-productivity, lower-earning state owned sector
to a more-productive, higher-wage private sector with less reliable
employment.  Some specific examples of models used to explain the
rise in income inequality will follow.
Aghion and Commander (1999) identify the following as factors
causing the increase in inequality in transition:  (1) asset redistribution
(primarily privatisation), (2) liberation of prices/inflation tax and
macroeconomic instability, (3) liberalisation of wages and tolerance of
unemployment, (4) shifts in the level and nature of public spending,
(5) tax changes, particularly the reduction in tax rates to improve work
incentives and (6) trade liberalisation and increased foreign
competition. Aghion and Commander then develop a general
equilibrium model in which trade liberalisation and changes in
organisations influence income inequality.
Trade liberalisation brings with it shifts in labour markets to
reflect international cost or productivity advantages. Aghion and
Commander argue that the socialist-period worker, while having a
large stock of human capital on average, has limited flexibility in
adjusting to new labour conditions. Also, if the savings from trade
accrued to input industries, the demand for skilled labour in the
transition economy may increase resulting in higher income
inequality.
The authors also point out that new technology, including
organisational changes, may lead to a widening of the income
distribution as some move to the new technology more quickly than
others.  If there are constraints limiting the speed of adjustment of
workers (or firms), then greater income inequality may result.  For our
work here, we would expect those who are younger and who have
higher education to be more flexible in making labour market
adjustments (either due to trade or technology). Gender or ethnic
barriers may also reduce the speed of adjustment of some workers.
That would mean that the dispersion among the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’
would be greatest in categories that are most limited in relocation.
Ferreira (1999) identifies the source of increased income
inequality to be (1) privatisation, (2) new markets for private
substitutes for public goods and (3) changes in the returns to
education.  Privatisation increases the assets of some by more than
others therefore increasing income inequality.  The new substitutes for
publicly provided goods (ex education, health care) allow some in
society greater access to productivity enhancing goods and therefore
income growth.  Finally, changes in the returns to education and more
volatility in the labour market lead to a greater spread in earnings.
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Since volatility in employment (i.e., unemployment) may affect
certain segments of the work force more than others, the result may be
widening factor and total income distributions.
Finally, Milanovic (1999) builds a model that shows the change
in income inequality as a result of the change in the composition of
income.  Rising wage inequality and greater emphasis on wages leads
to increased income inequality.  As in the previous models, workers
leave the state-sector and enter the private sector labour market.  If
they find employment, their returns increase since they earn more than
in the public sector. However, if they do not find employment, their
returns are less as they are now unemployed. As a result, income
inequality increases.
Milanovic also considers the source of income and points out that
the Gini coefficient is really a weighted average of the Gini
coefficients for wages, cash social transfers, and non-wage private
benefits where their weights are their shares in total income. This
approach is similar to that in our research paper where we are
examining the Gini coefficient for factor income separately from that
of the after-redistribution condition.
Table 4 shows the Gini coefficient of the with-in group income
distributions.  We see that factor income is more widely distributed for
female-headed households (65.19, female vs 52.54, male) while the
distribution of total disposable income is essentially equal (31.48,
female and 31.86, male).  This suggests that redistribution policies
equalise the income greatly among female-headed households.
However, this not to say that female-headed household receive equal
compensation to male-headed households (average incomes still are
very different).
The Gini coefficients by age group show a much different
distribution of both factor and total disposable income among the
oldest cohort than among the other age groups. The Gini coefficients
for factor income are practically identical for the youngest 3 age
groups but nearly twice as high (86.89) for the over 59 age group.
Disposable total income however is much, much more narrowly
distributed for the oldest group with a Gini coefficient of 18.02.  The
distribution of disposable income widens slightly from the youngest
age group to the 45-59 age group suggesting greater variability in
investment or productivity (Gini coefficients of 31, 34 and 36 as the
age of the head increases).
In terms of the education of the head of household, households
with a head having a basic education have a much wider dispersion of
factor income than the other education categories (Gini coefficient of
16
77.11 vs 52.17 and 48.43). The distribution of SSA and disposable
income, however, is widest for the college educated head group. The
change in the Gini coefficient from redistribution for households who
have a basic education is shocking – from 77.11 to 17.17.  Since those
with the least education are more likely to be unemployed or in
poverty, the much more narrow distribution of total income is
consistent.
4. International Comparisons of Factor and Disposable
Income Distributions
In this section, we consider characteristics of a society as a whole that
may have an influence on the extent of income redistribution and
therefore income inequality.  There is a huge literature attempting to
untangle the relationship between income inequality and economic
performance.  In this paper, we will be considering one aspect of this
relationship: how do the characteristics of a society influence income
inequality and redistribution.
Many authors have begun with a model of the Kuznets curve and
modified it to include one or more of the following (Chang and Ram,
2000).  In these models, the measure of inequality (Gini coefficient,
middle income share, etc) is estimated to be a quadratic function of
the recent past level of development (GDPPC) plus one or more of the
following factors.
(1) Education Differences and the Return to Education . O’Neill
(1995) examined the convergence of education level to determine if
this would contribute to convergence of incomes also. His results were
mixed; there was the suggestion of convergence among developed
countries but an international divergence. O’Neill attributed this to an
increased in the return to education among developed nations but not
globally. The growing use of technology increases the return to
education for those who can work in the skilled industry. 7 Those in the
unskilled one suffer as a result. The implications of a difference in
convergence behaviour among groups of nations may bring up an
interesting question for the transition economies. If the nature of
production differs between EU member and CEE nations, then will
the CEE income distribution further widen after European integration
as suggested by O’Neill’s findings?
 (2) Population and Population Growth . Rodgers (1983) points
out that increased population or population growth tends to increase
the supply of labour and therefore lower productivity per worker when
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the supply of capital or natural resources is fixed. Also, growing
populations put increased pressure on social aid and the increased cost
of schooling, health care, etc., reducing the ability of the nation to
produce.  Finally, high fertility rates decrease in ability of individuals
to work outside of home.
(3) Rate of Economic Growth, Unemployment . Chang and Ram
(2000) consider directly the inclusion of the rate of economic growth
in predicting income inequality.  The link they suggest between these
is because (1) increased inequality allows the wealthy to save more
and generate increased income in the future in the presence of
imperfect capital markets; (2) high growth is associated with
entrepreneurship and therefore a greater return to entrepreneurs and
(3) new technology does not benefit the population equally and
therefore new technology increases inequality. Vanhoudt (1997)
speaks of the link between higher unemployment and higher income
inequality.  This is also consistent with lower economic growth and
performance.
(4) Trade.  Richardson (1995) reviews the discussion of the
relationship between trade and income inequality.  This is particularly
important as we anticipate the further opening of the borders between
the existing EU nations and the CEE countries.  Integration will likely
increase the impact of trade on the income distribution. The author
points out that trade may be a factor in increasing income inequality,
particularly when technology is involved. However, he specifies that
trade may very well be a small influence or simply a mechanism for
change as a result of technology differences.
(5) Institutional Characteristics and Quality.  Wright (1978) draws
a distinction between classical economic factors and institutional
factors.  The nature of the rules and regulations and mechanisms of
society may promote or detract from income equality. Chong and
Calderon (2000) consider the influence of institutions and corruption
on income inequality and find that improved institutional quality
increases income inequality (by differential returns to parts of society)
and later reduced income inequality.
(6)  Gender Equality .  The ability of female-headed households
to participate in the labour market and share in the gains of growth
would be influenced by culture and institutions. Efforts have been
made to compare the ‘gender friendliness’ of institutions and cultures
across nations.  The Gender Development Index (World Bank, 2001)
is one such empirical attempt.  There is also an indirect route of
influence between gender equality and income distribution. Dollar and
Gatti (1999) examines the influence of gender inequality (measured
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by the World Bank’s Gender Development index) and finds that
higher inequality reduces the rate of growth. Since the returns to
growth vary by groups within the population (as suggested above),
gender equality may influence future income distribution. Sequino
(1999), on the other hand, finds that greater gender equality reduces
the rate of growth that is explained by higher labour costs for women.
In this section, we consider country specific characteristics that
may influence the distribution of factor or disposable income.  We
have collected data on 19 European and CEE/FSU nations (see
Appendix 1) regarding income distribution and the influences above.
Data were gathered through international organisations to increase the
comparability of the statistics (World Bank, Penn World Tables, etc).
A description of the data and sources is included in Appendix 2.
Descriptive statistics for the various characteristics included in
the model are shown in Table 5. We also show average values
separately for CEE and European nations.  The Gini coefficient levels
for factor income and disposable income (from Milanovic, 2000) were
not found to be significantly different. The statistically significant
differences found between the European and CEE nations were in the
overall proportion of school age population enrolled in school (the
flow of education) and in two institutional variables, the Gender
Development Index which considers the equality of women in society
and the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom which considers the
extent of commitment to free markets (lack of regulation, absence of
black market, functioning capital markets, etc). These indices show
that the level of economic opportunity for women is less in the CEE
countries compared to the European country group and that the market
is more subject to distortions through regulation, market imperfections
and black market activity.
In order to get a rough idea of the interrelationships between
these characteristics and the income inequality in a country, a multiple
regression equation is estimated. The results are shown in Table 6.
Due to the very small size of the sample, results must be examined
carefully.  However, we found an Adjusted R-squared between 0.644
and 0.844 for models of the three income inequality measures.
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Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics for International Comparison
(1) (2) (3)
ALL
Countries
European
Countries
CEE
Countries
T-Statistic of
Coeff Diffs
(2) and (3)
Dependent Variables:
Gini of Disposable 32.100 31.877 32.583 -0.102
      Total Income (7.03) (5.17) (10.65)
Gini of Gross 49.842 48.846 52.000 -0.578
      Factor Income (5.69) (4.25) (8.07)
Difference in Gini 17.742 16.969 19.417 -0.526
     of Disp and Fac Inc (4.71) (4.98) (3.93)
Regressors:
DEPRATIO 0.515 0.541 0.459 1.007
(0.10) (0.11) (0.03)
POP 28.208 25.690 33.665 -0.228
(35.66) (26.75) (52.98)
POPGROW 0.260 0.327 0.114 1.031
(0.23) (0.16) (0.31)
GDP 1980 9059.947 10899.769 5073.667 3.257
(3296.60) (1967.31) (1401.80)
ENROLL 82.000 86.154 73.000 2.187
(8.65) (6.64) (4.65)
INV 20.274 18.499 24.120 -1.551
(4.43) (3.47) (3.97)
GENDEVE 21.053 12.923 38.667 -2.646
(15.69) (7.69) (14.15)
URBAN 73.895 77.000 67.167 0.944
(11.60) (12.36) (6.21)
GDP GRO 1.521 2.354 -0.283 1.056
(2.85) (1.83) (3.95)
HERITAGE INDEX 2.371 2.165 2.817 -2.256
(0.43) (0.20) (0.48)
PHYSICANS 3.132 3.069 3.268 -0.202
(0.98) (1.09) (0.76)
N 19 13 6
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Table 6.  Gini Coefficient Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent:
Gini for
Total Disp
Income
Gini for
Gross
Factor Income
Difference in
Gini
Coefficients
T-Test of
Coeff (1)
and (2)
Intercept -27.302 44.465 ** 71.767 ** 2.454
(35.84) (22.66) (28.74)
DEPRATIO 37.828 ** 5.994 -31.834 ** -2.417
(16.13) (10.20) (12.94)
POPN 0.104 ** 0.091 *** -0.013 -0.431
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
POPGROW -0.045 -1.349 -1.304 -0.295
(5.42) (3.43) (4.35)
GDP80 0.00098 0.00051 -0.00047 -0.706
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ENROLL 0.206 -0.112 -0.318 * -1.854
(0.21) (0.13) (0.17)
INV -0.275 -0.858 *** -0.583 ** -2.545
(0.28) (0.18) (0.23)
GENDEV 0.425 *** 0.262 *** -0.163 * -1.904
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08)
URBAN -0.058 0.087 0.145 1.769
(0.10) (0.06) (0.08)
GDPGRO 1.009 0.788 -0.221 -0.347
(0.78) (0.49) (0.63)
HERITAGE 2.617 4.970 2.353 0.644
(4.47) (2.83) (3.59)
PHYSICANS 1.211 -1.136 -2.347 -1.307
(2.20) (1.39) (1.77)
CEE 2.118 2.140 0.022 0.003
(10.35) (6.54) (8.30)
Rsquared 0.915 0.948 0.878
Adj Rsquared 0.744 0.844 0.633
F-stat p-value 0.025 0.007 0.064
N 19 19 19
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Our results indicate the following:
The role of women in society, the growth of population and the
population under 18 and over 65 as a proportion of the working age
population all impact overall disposable income distribution
significantly.  Greater disparity in the treatment of women and higher
population growth increased income inequality in a country
significantly. A larger dependent population also increased the income
inequality, which is not consistent with theories of institutions being
influenced to direct more to social programs if there is a larger
dependent population. While not statistically significant, greater
enrolment in schooling, greater commitment to health care (measured
with physicians per 1000 inhabitants) and greater rates of growth
increased income inequality. Greater investment lowered income
inequality, as did greater urbanisation of the country.  The coefficient
on CEE was very insignificant.
In contrast, the distribution of factor income was not influenced
by the extent of non-working age population but instead showed
significantly reduced factor income inequality resulting from
increased investment.  Gender development again was negative and
statistically significant indicating those with a high Gender
Development rank (therefore worse gender equality) had a higher Gini
coefficient.
The coefficients for dependency ratio, enrolment, investment,
and gender development were significantly different in the distribution
of disposable income and distribution of factor income regression
models.  In each case, the sign of the coefficient remained the same,
but the magnitude of its influence on income inequality changed
significantly between the disposable income model and the factor
income model.
It was surprising that overall institutional characteristics
(measured by the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom) and the CEE
dummy variable were statistically insignificant in predicting any of
our Gini coefficients.  Variables related to the demands on the society
(the dependency ratio, population size), the economic environment for
women (gender development) and variables linked to input
development (enrolment, investment) were sufficient to explain the
differences between Gini coefficients in the European and CEE
countries.  However, it is important to note that gender development,
investment and enrolment in education are all correlated with
economic growth and therefore a more sophisticated model may be
appropriate.8
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5. Summary
The purpose of this research has been to investigate the influence of
income redistribution on the income distribution. We compare the
distribution of factor income (which comes from market-oriented
sources) and disposable income (which is influenced by market
income, social transfers and taxation). We provide both a detailed
study of the Estonian income distribution in 1999 and an international
comparison of versus disposable total income distribution in 19
European and CEE countries.
We found that the disposable income distribution was much
more equalised in Estonia suggesting an important role is being played
by social transfers and taxation policy. The Gini coefficient changes
from 60.13 for factor income to 31.80 for disposable income.  While
we cannot say that this is the ideal policy since, as of yet, the
relationship between income inequality and economic performance of
a nation is still under question. What we can say is that the
redistributive policies had a dramatic impact on income distribution in
Estonia as suggested by Milanovic (1999a) for other CEE countries.
The distribution and level of both factor and disposable income
differs greatly among households with male versus female heads,
based on the age of the head of household and based on the education
of the head of household. Those households with diminished ability to
respond to the new market economy had both diminished levels of
factor and disposable income. Among two of the most disadvantaged
groups (heads with less than a secondary education and heads aged 60
years and older), the distribution of factor income was very wide
compared to other groups while the distribution of disposable income
was much more narrow than others.  This suggests that these groups
rely on redistribution policy to make up for deficiencies in factor
income among some group members. While factor incomes vary
widely, the overall income distribution is very narrow.
International comparisons of factor and disposable income
distributions show that both factor and disposable income distribution
is influenced more strongly by gender development, influences from
population size and composition and the accumulation of resources
(through investment and school enrolment) than by the transition
nation of economies in Europe. A dummy variable for CEE nation
was statistically insignificant in explaining any differences in the Gini
coefficients of CEE and European nations in our model.  Institutional
characteristics measured by the Heritage Foundation Index of
Economic Freedom were also statistically insignificant. While the
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direction of causality is questionable and therefore we cannot make
strong policy suggestions, it seems improvements in the ability of
disadvantaged members of the population to participate in the market
economy will further equalise overall income distribution.
Notes
1. Wright (1978) points out the early debates about income inequality and
growth by focusing on the Kuznets curve and Institutionalist arguments.
Persson and Tabellini (1994) show how a median-voter model implies
lower future growth resulting from higher degrees of inequality.
Research by Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) however uses the same
basic median-voter model to show that voters in societies with more
unequal income distributions may vote for stronger provision of
education therefore increasing human capital and the rate of growth.
Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa (1999) discuss the implications of
modern growth theory suggesting that growth can increase as a result of
decreased income inequality, based on the fundamentals of imperfect
capital markets and macroeconomic volatility.
2. The HIES survey is a longitudinal survey with a 3-month rotation in t he
panel.  This paper did not focus on the longitudinal aspect of the data
set and it was beyond the focus to create a new weighting mechanism
for a non-panel data set.  For this reason, we focus on one quarter only
for 1999.  While ideally an annual data set would avoid any seasonality,
we chose the third quarter for comparability to the earliest quarter for
while we have access to detailed household surveys, the third quarter of
1995.  This analysis is available from the authors.
3. The average exchange r ate in Quarter 3, 1999 was 14.90 Estonian
kroons per dollar. The Estonian kroon was pegged to the Deutsche
Mark at 8 kroons per DM.
4. The same caution as for very young households applies in the case of
the elderly.  Those who cannot afford to live on their own are likely to
live with other family members and therefore this average household
income per member value does not reflect the average individual
income values for the elderly.  A detailed analysis of the elderly in
Estonia was conducted in Wilder (1999).
5. Notice that some households had no factor income. This is why the
percentage earned of gross factor income by deciles 1, 2 and 3 is 0
percent.  An alternative would be to calculate the distribution of gross
factor income among households that received some gross factor
income.  The distribution for households with factor income >0 is much
more equalised and very close to the distribution for disposable total
income.  The Gini coefficient in this case is 39.83.  While being an
effective measure of the income dispersion among workers, this
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distribution does not contribute to the understanding of distribution
among the population as a whole.
6. Because the first three deciles of the gross factor income distribution
are zero, we concentrate on describing the population based on their
disposable total income. A description of households in the 4 th-10th
deciles of gross factor income is available from the authors.
7.   Note the similarity here to Aghion and Commander’s theory previously
discussed.
8. The simple correlation coefficient between gender development and
GDP80 -0.665 and between gender development and enrol was 0.664.
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Appendix 1.  Country List for International Comparison
European
Countries
Central and East
European Countries
Belgium Czech Republic
Denmark Estonia
Finland Hungary
France Poland
Germany Russia
Ireland Slovak Republic
Italy
The Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
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Appendix 2.  Data Description and Sources
Estonia Household Data:   Data for the 1999 Household Income and
Expenditure Survey was provided, along with all necessary documentation
and weighting information, from the Estonian Statistical Office.  We are very
grateful for this support.
International Income Distribution Comparison Data:
GINI FAC and GINI DISP:  Gini coefficient of factor income and Gini
coefficient of disposable income were found through Milanovic (2000).
Milanovic included additional countries in his data – specifically countries in
North America and Asia.  We chose to include only those in Europe.  The
sample does not contain all the countries of the European Union or the
applicant nations.  This is due to a careful screening of the household surveys
for before inclusion in the database.  While this has the effect of reducing
sample size and excludes some nations we would like to include, the
consistency of measurement is an important advantage.
From World Bank, Human Development Report.
http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query .
DEPRATIO: Dependency Ratio the population below age 18 + over age 65
as a percentage of the working age population in each country.
POPN:  Population size.  The number of country inhabitants in millions.
POPGROW:  The rate of population growth in the country in 1995.
ENROLL:  Secondary School Enrolment as a portion of total population of
this age in the country.
GDPGRO:  Average Annual Growth from 1990-1998 in Gross Domestic
Product per capita.  This is measured in 1985 International prices.
PHYSICIANS:  Physicians relative to the population of the country.  This is
measured as the number of physicians in the country per 1000 people.
GENDEV:  Gender Development Index from the United Nations
Development Report.  Lowest numbers indicate most equality for women.
From the Penn World Tables
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
GDP80: Gross Domestic Product per capita in 1980 (considered distant
enough to avoid simultaneity in the model).  This measured in international,
1985 prices.
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INV:  Investment is measured as the percentage of GDP in investment in
1992.  Since the values are ratios in internal currency units, international
prices are not an issue.
From Xist Data Library:
http://www.xist.org
URBAN:  Percentage of the population living in urban areas
From Heritage Foundation:
http://www.heritage.org/index/
HERITAGE:  Index of Economic Freedom, which considers many
institutional aspects of a country.  Specifically, countries are evaluated by
examining trade relationships, taxation, government intervention, price
controls, regulation and the extent of the black market.  A high score here
indicates distance from a pure market system.
